The Women’s Movement in the Maghreb: with emphasis on Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria

Rabéa Naciri*
Translated from French by Lynn Maalouf.

Women in the Maghreb and the Arab world at large are usually represented as inferior, submissive and dependent, living in a male-dominated, patriarchal society. Apart from the fact that these women have in fact never been fully subservient, their experiences with patriarchal society vary according to their social background, their educational level, activities and professional status. They have always resorted to whatever means they had to resist their subordination. The feminist movement now emerging on the Maghrebi political and social scene constitutes a modern form of this resistance, and is the inheritor of an ancient tradition of opposition of Maghrebi women to all forms of oppression.

Since the independence of Morocco (1956), Tunisia (1957) and Algeria (1962), deep-seated changes have taken place in these countries, transforming their social and family structures as well as the relationship between man and woman. Resistance to change, however, remains strong, with both men and women trying to save an overvalued and mystified tradition of a past forever gone.

While in the wake of independence the number of educated women in the Maghreb was slight, women now make up 4 out of 10 university students in all three countries. Despite differences between these three countries, education is everywhere strongly valorized by professional activity, whether at the level of the importance of women’s activity or with regard to the fields of their employment. The spectacular recent increase in women’s demand for work highlights the magnitude of the ongoing changes.

In all three countries, the average age of women at first marriage is currently 26 in Morocco, 27 in Algeria and 29 in Tunisia. Moreover, a woman’s permanent celibacy is no longer perceived as abnormal or shameful. Women in executive positions live on their own and are perfectly integrated socially, even though marriage remains a quasi-universal practice and widely valued institution.

Women also have fewer children than in the past. The use of contraceptives is expanding even in the countryside, and the ideal family model is no longer the patriarchal “extended” family but a smaller “nuclear” family centered on the couple and their children.

These changes slowly introduced others in social and family practices: for example, when a baby girl is born, it is no longer perceived as a catastrophe, and families tend to treat daughters and sons equally, whether as to education or as to leisure occupations. Several studies conducted in Morocco have shown that where there are constraints such as extreme poverty, or remoteness from educational institutions, parents may give priority to sons, but in the absence of such constraints they usually treat their children equally.

The Maghrebi states have not acknowledged these social and economic changes however. Since their respective independences, political leaders have generally adopted policies that seek to transform their societies through education and women’s activism. But at the same time, they have done all they can to curb the impact of these changes. The strategies developed differ, but they generally tend to maintain male privilege and traditional family structures.

Among the means used to this end, family law has resisted social changes and the women’s movements, both in Morocco and in Algeria. The situation in Tunisia is quite exceptional: the Tunisian personal status code is one of the most egalitarian in the region, or in the Arab world.

This tendency to curb ongoing transformations by not legitimizing them, and by resorting almost systematically to religion and forms of social and political control, has combined with dire economic conditions to deepen the crisis all three countries are suffering from.

It was in this context that the current movement of Maghrebi women emerged, simultaneously in the three countries, around the mid-1980s. This movement is a combined result of: i) social disruptions that impacted women’s social-economic status; ii) women’s reaction to the incoherencies and contradictions of public policies, and to the inferior status they are locked into within their families and at the lower end of the professional scale; and iii) their exclusion from the spheres of public and political decision-making.

A growing awareness of women’s contribution to economic development, the dissemination of feminist values at the international level, through the Women’s International Year (1975), and the UN Decade for Women (1976-1985), favored the emergence of this movement as organized groups in all three countries.

But this birth is also the result of a long maturation, stretching back before independence, that gradually consolidated itself to become the privileged product of social and political changes. The Maghrebi feminist movement is a new actor, with a political and social project that is coherent and ambitious, aiming to reestablish women’s rights and dignity, and thereby bring about profound changes in their respective societies. Women’s struggle for their emancipation has accompanied the main political and social changes that have taken place in the region since the beginning of the 20th century. They bear witness to the changes of the past few decades, despite the appearance of stagnation that these three countries may currently give.

I. Women, Colonialism and Liberation Movements

One of the commonalities between the three countries of the central Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) is that all three were colonized by France. Algeria’s occupation lasted longest and was the most painful. French colonization had multiple and profound effects, albeit in different degrees, on the three countries and on the status of women.

The An-Nahda Movement

As in the Middle East (especially Egypt and Blad ash-Sham), contact with the colonizers was a shock that, among other effects, made Maghrebi intellectuals (educated in Europe or the Middle East), demand the renovation of Islamic thought and the reform of society. Women’s status was part of a debate that started in the 1830s and 1840s. Indeed, several An-Nahda thinkers in the Maghreb, influenced by the reformist ideology of the Middle East, started calling for the education of girls.

The ‘Ulamas opposed this reformist trend, claiming that French education in North Africa was contrary to Islam and would lead to a loss of identity through acculturation. According to them, this education was against God and the Nation and it was this that motivated ‘Ulamas such as Ben Badis in Algeria, Allal El-Fassi in Morocco, and Tahar Haddad in Tunisia, as well as nationalists, to establish free Islamic education. But at these free schools, they had no choice but to set a good example and send their daughters; but this education had to take place in an Arab and Islamic framework, and had to take care not to misdirect girls away from their ‘natural’ vocation, i.e. fulfilling their reproductive and family role.

Having experienced another vision of the world, educated young men belonging to the better-off urban strata and the bourgeoisie, started calling for the right of girls - their future wives - to education. The marriage market forced parents to adapt to this new situation, and the ignorance of women started being perceived as dangerous, since intellectuals were marrying educated foreign women.

The mobilization of certain ‘Ulamas in favor of education for girls, its adoption by the nationalist movements in all three countries, and the pressure from intellectuals, removed the last resistance to girls’ education. Well before independence, the three countries bet on educating...
tion as a means to accelerate national liberation, and economic development. Priority was given to the education of boys, but the education of girls, despite some resistance (especially strong in Morocco), was adopted by the three nationalist movements.  

The Limits of Masculine Reformism

The history of the Maghreb countries teaches us that women chose their communal identity to fight colonialism, even though they had to suffer heightened control over their freedom of movement. Veiled and hidden from the eyes of Christian colonizers, to whom the 'Muslim woman' was an object of curiosity and fantasy, Magnhrebi women played both direct and indirect roles in their countries' independence struggles. They had to live the conflict between the identity of colonized people and that of subordinate women, in the hope that independence would be beneficial to them as to men.

The reformists' commitment to education for girls soon showed its limits. Indeed, according to them, education had to give priority to women's domestic role, and the main aim of education was to improve this role. But even though quantitatively and qualitatively limited, the education of women started having effects that went beyond the strict limits set by the patriarchal reformists. Women of the urban elites wanted to make their voices heard, and quit the protective, paternalistic isolation in which the male reformists wanted to keep them. These dissident voices were those of women who had the same cultural resources as men but, because they were women, had become aware of the conditions of women in their countries. Isolated in the beginning, these voices grew more confident as they turned to new resources, and particularly as they had made an active contribution to their countries' national liberation movements.

In Morocco, the women's section of the Istiqlal party (the main party calling for independence), the Union of Moroccan Women (formed by the Communist party in 1944), and the Association of the Sisters of Puriti (Jam'iyyat Ikhawat al-Safa), belonging to the Party of Democracy and Independence (PDI, 1944), were the first to take a political position on the take-over from the colonial powers, added to the desire to speed up the modernization process, gave education a priori social identity. To attract women to the PSC (the Party of Socialists and Revolutionaries) of the new republic of Morocco. Moreover, a pressing social demand that began among the intellectual elite well before independence, spread to other social classes, which saw education as the means to improve their economic and social conditions.

The Limits of National Development Policies

The post-colonial Maghrebi states adopted different means to the common aim of modernizing their societies while safeguarding patriarchy, so as to secure the loyalty of pre-modern forces and leaderships. The development strategy they adopted conformed to the needs of the industrialized countries, and consisted in a modernization process involving factors and tools of production, without changing relations of production or gender relations within the patriarchal family.

The best illustration is the post-independence position of all three states regarding codification of the status of women and family relations. Tunisia, through the Moroccanization and modernizing policy of President Bourguiba, and within an Islamic system of reference, opted for an emancipating legislation; Morocco tried to establish the idea that from the mere fact of their participation in the independence struggle, women had gained their full dignity as citizens and automatically acquired all their rights.  

So much so that when in 1984 Algerian feminists called for revision or abrogation of the PSC, conservatives and Islamists accused them of being ‘daughters of France’, and ‘westernized’, forgetting or pretending to forget the role of women in the struggle of new Maghrebi states. New attempts were made to reconcile claims made by the women’s movement by appealing to anti-colonial feelings and to reflexes of community and identity that had not ceased to function several decades after independence. The Algerian state resorted to this method several times, well before the emergence of Islamism.

In Morocco, in the euphoria of independence, the doors to education and work were opened to women. Allal Faïd, one of the great reformist thinkers of the time, started encouraging women to join their ranks. To this end, awareness was created of the role of women in mobilizing women for the struggle against colonialism. This mobilization appealed to women as holding their countries’ future in their hands, but the question of their status was never raised.

In Tunisia, thanks to the powerful reformist movement led by Tahar Haddad and dresh Ben Achour, the status of women was raised very early on (in the 1930s) as a necessary condition for the modernization of the country. The first attempts to organize women belonging to the Tunisian urban bourgeoisie took the form of social and charitable commitment towards poorer women. But this movement very quickly engaged in the struggle against French colonization under the banner of the Neo-Destour party (formed in 1934). As in the other two countries, the Tunisian Communist party created two women’s organizations affiliated to it (the Union of Women in Tunisia and the Union of Tunisian Young Women, 1944). Women also joined the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), as well as other political groups.

During this period, in all the Maghreb countries, priority was given to issues related to the ideological and political orientations of the different formations. The issue of women’s rights had no place except as a political issue between nationalists and colonizers, and between conservatives and reformists. Women were mobilized around these issues without ever having the opportunity to express their specific demands and aspirations.

Patriarchy and Colonization

The arrival of Western colonizers in the Maghreb, with an ideological practice, and a discourse of ‘I bring civilization and development to the indigenous people’ created an identity tension among the population that crystallized around women, family and religion. The latter constituted the most powerful tool to resist the colonizers and their values; this well-known and well-analyzed process placed Arab and Muslim women at the intersection between two identities that of an oppressed community and that of subordinated women.

The colonial heritage also held a very important place in representations of Islam, which functioned as a resistance force against conquest and assimilation, and which was used by the nationalists of the colonized countries as a mobilizing weapon. For years ‘... colonialism were the neutral mask of universal progress in order to subjugate the people, thereby maintaining a confusion between modernity, colonialism and domination.  

Indeed, as Yusuf Itunc points out, ‘... for several third World countries, access to modernity consists of nothing more nor less than in breaking with the boundaries of ethnicity, emphasizing the secular identity of the nation-state, developing a rational and scientific view of development, and treating individuals as autonomous beings.’

in Algeria, colonizers and anti-colonizers used the status of women as a political card. In 1958, France called upon women to burn their veils in a major public square in Algiers, while shouting ‘French Algeria’. This move served to ’clarify the problem, because spontaneously, without any orders, Algerian women who had been for a long time unveiled, re-adopted the halat, stating that Algerian women would not be liberated at the invitation of France.‘

To sum up in the work of Zakia Daoud, ‘Every questioning of the status quo was judged as conforming to the colonial power’s integratorist policy, and condemned as a project of destruction of identity.’

II. Maghrebi Women in the Post-Colonial Period

As soon as these countries achieved their independence, they all chose education as a cornerstone of their development programs, despite their different political orientations. They all wished to take-over from the colonial powers, added to the desire to speed up the modernization process, gave education a priori social identity. To attract women to the PSC (the Party of Socialists and Revolutionaries) of the new republic of Morocco. Moreover, a pressing social demand that began among the intellectual elite well before independence, spread to other social classes, which saw education as the means to improve their economic and social conditions.

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was appointed by King Mohammed V in 1957/58 to help to codify customary Islamic law. Contrary to expectations, this Commission rapidly produced a muddawana that consecrated and institutionalized the subordination of women. This text constituted the keystone used by the state to establish the juridical, political and economic foundations of independent Morocco, and as basis of its authority and power. This subordination of women was used to pacify the most conservative ulamas and most traditional milieux, just as one throws crumbs to the poor, so they would remain quiet and leave all serious political business in the hands of the state.

In Morocco first, and then in Algeria, the PSC, simple legal texts, were increasingly sacralized and given the function of permanently fixing the status of women, whereas all other laws were able to evolve freely in a modernity accepted as temporal. One cannot explain more selectively, and the negative aspects of tradition or/and by the weight of tradition. The legal texts, were increasingly sacrilized and given the function of permanently fixing the status of women, whereas all other laws were able to evolve freely in a specificity that isolates them.

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This enclosure of women within anti-colonialist and communal boundaries continued long after the decolonization of the Maghreb. Maghrebi women had to be held back in a specificity that isolates them. Anything could change, but women were called on to remain in their place, to continue working in the home, to be child-carer and never as the legal guardian, except in the case of the father's death or other restricted cases. Moreover, a divorced mother and guardian of minor children does not have the right to keep the marital house except in rare cases, and cannot remarry without losing the right to look after her children, whereas a father's remarriage does not entail the same effects. The law of inheritance has adopted the rule of inequality between men and women. With the exception of Tunisia, the principle of ta'liq means that in the absence of a male heir, the collateral of the deceased compete for the inheritance with female children. Furthermore, in all three countries, a non-Muslim woman has no right to inherit from her Muslim husband. Other subterfuges have been used to stop women from inheriting: in Morocco, the habous or wa'af allows the children to control all power through sending women back to their domestic and reproductive roles. The state had contributed to destabilize the old order by secularizing the law, through education, and through the massive employment of women, which resulted in making the small nuclear family the norm. The law, in all these countries, has always been in favor of the man, with the goal of preserving the status quo, controlling claims, and securing the reproduction of the dominant ranks of women. Initially social action and consciousness-raising with women were privileged. But very quickly the law was employed to further the interests of male heirs, disinherit the female heirs; the obligatory legacy (wasiyya wajba) gives the right to give a legal share to a pre-deceased son to benefit from an inheritance while depriving the children of a pre-deceased daughter of the same rights. Since independence, state interventions have mainly aimed at preserving the status quo, controlling claims, and neutralizing social and political forces in opposition. If today the societies of the Maghreb confront a political Islam, one has to admit that the latter has managed to gain ground so rapidly because it found a favorable political, economic and social terrain.

Women's Voices: the Post-Independence Generation

Soon after independence, women who had participated in political action and resistance returned to their homes to carry out the “noble task” assigned by their past companions, namely educating future citizens. Those who decided to continue in spite of this, invested their efforts in social work and charity.

But very quickly, thanks to the spread of education and salaried professional jobs, the working generation of women who had not participated in the struggle for independence, joined political and union organizations. Despite the hardships of the 1960s, the juncrature, and repression, some women struggled within these organizations, which had always given priority to establishing socialism, social justice, and democracy, never to claims for gender equality.

Starting from the mid-1970s, a new stage in the history of Morocco began, one of the first of these new generations which enabled greater freedom of speech. This allowed opposition parties to resume their activities, including women, who started organizing themselves in women’s sections within their respective parties. This period of political openness in Morocco coincided with the UN Decade for Women (1976-1985), as well as the promulgation of the Convention against discrimination against women (CEDAW) in 1979. These events offered opportunities for women to intensify the debate within party structures on their positions and commitments to women’s issues, and more specifically to the issue of revising the muddawana (PSC).

The explicit aim of these women’s sections was to increase the audience for their own parties among the ranks of women. Initially social action and consciousness-raising with women were privileged. But very quickly the law was employed to further the interests of male heirs, disinherit the female heirs; the obligatory legacy (wasiyya wajba) gives the right to give a legal share to a pre-deceased son to benefit from an inheritance while depriving the children of a pre-deceased daughter of the same rights. Since independence, state interventions have mainly aimed at preserving the status quo, controlling claims, and neutralizing social and political forces in opposition. If today the societies of the Maghreb confront a political Islam, one has to admit that the latter has managed to gain ground so rapidly because it found a favorable political, economic and social terrain.